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neuron-tai/.scratch/alpha-hardening/issues/07-fraud-commitment-bisection-blame.md
Dobromir Popov 9abe83b5f4 feat(alpha): complete hardening backlog
Complete the alpha-hardening Ralph task set, including tracker billing/accounting guards, validator fraud-audit primitives, wallet binding proof support, documentation runbooks, and updated tests.

Verification: .venv/bin/python -m compileall -q packages tests; .venv/bin/python -m pytest -q --tb=short (313 passed, 3 skipped, 1 failed: tests/test_mining_cli.py::test_legacy_start_without_port_uses_next_available_port because meshnet-node pid 1263451 is already listening on port 7000).
2026-07-05 21:47:23 +03:00

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Status: done
# 07 — FRAUD: On-demand commitment + hop bisection blame
## What to build
On audit selection, require nodes to supply TOPLOC-style fingerprints of **output boundary activations** per hop (on-demand, brief retention). On verify failure, referee identifies the **first divergent hop** — not always the last text node.
**Code refs:**
- `packages/validator/meshnet_validator/__init__.py``_slash_route`, `_final_text_node` bug (~102140) — blames `max(shard_end)` only
- `packages/tracker/meshnet_tracker/server.py` — route hop construction (~17741783) — cut-points for bisection
- Research: `.scratch/alpha-hardening/research-verifiable-inference.md` §1.2, §8 layer 3 (Verde **pattern**, not on-chain game)
## Test-first
1. Red: two-hop route, corrupt hop-0 activations — `_final_text_node` blames hop-1 — test must fail.
2. Green: bisection selects hop-0; forfeit targets hop-0 wallet.
3. On-demand: commitment requested only when audit flag set on proxied request.
## Acceptance criteria
- [x] Audit requests carry tracker RNG/VRF flag indistinguishable from normal traffic (research §6) — the existing post-hoc `sample_rate` RNG gate in `ValidatorProcess.validate_once` already decides audit selection after the original proxied request completed, so the request the client/nodes saw is unaffected either way; locked in by `test_hop_commitments_are_not_requested_unless_the_event_is_audit_selected`
- [x] Nodes retain recent boundary activations for on-demand commit window (configurable TTL) — `ToplocAuditConfig.commitment_ttl_seconds`; expired commitments fall back to the text-only path (`test_expired_commitment_window_falls_back_to_text_only_audit`)
- [x] Validator/tracker compares fingerprints at each hop cut-point; first mismatch = culprit — `_hop_commitments_from_event` + `_first_divergent_hop` in `packages/validator/meshnet_validator/__init__.py`
- [x] `_final_text_node` removed or limited to text-only fallback — only called from the plain-text divergence branch of `_validate_event` now
- [x] Integration test: multi-hop pipeline, fault injected at known hop — `tests/test_hop_bisection.py`
## ADR links
- [ADR-0018](../../docs/adr/0018-fraud-detection-verification-and-reputation.md) §34
## Blocked by
- `06-fraud-toploc-integration.md`