68e057209c
Lock alpha scope, tracker auth, TOPLOC fraud verification, and deferred multi-tracker money-path work; supersede legacy fraud issues with ADR-0018. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
36 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
36 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
Status: ready-for-agent
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# 07 — FRAUD: On-demand commitment + hop bisection blame
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## What to build
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On audit selection, require nodes to supply TOPLOC-style fingerprints of **output boundary activations** per hop (on-demand, brief retention). On verify failure, referee identifies the **first divergent hop** — not always the last text node.
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**Code refs:**
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- `packages/validator/meshnet_validator/__init__.py` — `_slash_route`, `_final_text_node` bug (~102–140) — blames `max(shard_end)` only
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- `packages/tracker/meshnet_tracker/server.py` — route hop construction (~1774–1783) — cut-points for bisection
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- Research: `.scratch/alpha-hardening/research-verifiable-inference.md` §1.2, §8 layer 3 (Verde **pattern**, not on-chain game)
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## Test-first
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1. Red: two-hop route, corrupt hop-0 activations — `_final_text_node` blames hop-1 — test must fail.
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2. Green: bisection selects hop-0; forfeit targets hop-0 wallet.
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3. On-demand: commitment requested only when audit flag set on proxied request.
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## Acceptance criteria
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- [ ] Audit requests carry tracker RNG/VRF flag indistinguishable from normal traffic (research §6)
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- [ ] Nodes retain recent boundary activations for on-demand commit window (configurable TTL)
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- [ ] Validator/tracker compares fingerprints at each hop cut-point; first mismatch = culprit
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- [ ] `_final_text_node` removed or limited to text-only fallback
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- [ ] Integration test: multi-hop pipeline, fault injected at known hop
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## ADR links
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- [ADR-0018](../../docs/adr/0018-fraud-detection-verification-and-reputation.md) §3–4
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## Blocked by
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- `06-fraud-toploc-integration.md`
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