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D.Popov 68e057209c Add alpha-hardening ADRs and issue plan from pre-release audit.

Lock alpha scope, tracker auth, TOPLOC fraud verification, and deferred multi-tracker money-path work; supersede legacy fraud issues with ADR-0018.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

2026-07-04 23:12:09 +03:00

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Status: ready-for-agent

07 — FRAUD: On-demand commitment + hop bisection blame

What to build

On audit selection, require nodes to supply TOPLOC-style fingerprints of output boundary activations per hop (on-demand, brief retention). On verify failure, referee identifies the first divergent hop — not always the last text node.

Code refs:

packages/validator/meshnet_validator/__init__.py — _slash_route, _final_text_node bug (~102–140) — blames max(shard_end) only
packages/tracker/meshnet_tracker/server.py — route hop construction (~1774–1783) — cut-points for bisection
Research: .scratch/alpha-hardening/research-verifiable-inference.md §1.2, §8 layer 3 (Verde pattern, not on-chain game)

Test-first

Red: two-hop route, corrupt hop-0 activations — _final_text_node blames hop-1 — test must fail.
Green: bisection selects hop-0; forfeit targets hop-0 wallet.
On-demand: commitment requested only when audit flag set on proxied request.

Acceptance criteria

Audit requests carry tracker RNG/VRF flag indistinguishable from normal traffic (research §6)
Nodes retain recent boundary activations for on-demand commit window (configurable TTL)
Validator/tracker compares fingerprints at each hop cut-point; first mismatch = culprit
_final_text_node removed or limited to text-only fallback
Integration test: multi-hop pipeline, fault injected at known hop

ADR links

ADR-0018 §3–4

Blocked by

06-fraud-toploc-integration.md

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