Lock alpha scope, tracker auth, TOPLOC fraud verification, and deferred multi-tracker money-path work; supersede legacy fraud issues with ADR-0018. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
1.9 KiB
Status: done (core forfeiture wired); remaining fraud scope superseded — see ADR-0018 and .scratch/alpha-hardening/issues/06-fraud-toploc-integration.md through 10-fraud-penalty-calibration-wiring.md.
34 — Hardened proof-of-work: pending-balance forfeiture penalty
What to build
Wire the validator's ~5% sampling (issue 07) to the new penalty per ADR-0015. On confirmed output divergence:
- The node's entire pending balance is forfeited to the protocol cut, in the same ledger transaction as the strike (no window where a payout can race the penalty).
- A strike is recorded; the third strike bans the wallet — registration rejected, excluded from all routes, and any unpaid pending balance is never paid out.
The probationary period (first N jobs unpaid, default 50) is retained as the anti-sybil re-entry cost, and the node CLI shows remaining probation jobs.
Why this deters cheating: settlement is periodic, so the pending balance itself is the collateral — no upfront stake deposit, zero onboarding friction. At a 5% check rate a cheater is caught once per ~20 fraudulent jobs, so the penalty must exceed ~20× the per-job gain; with daily settlement, pending ≈ a full day's earnings, well above that bar. Document this math in the validator README.
Acceptance criteria
- Divergence → pending balance forfeited to
protocol_cutatomically with the strike - 3rd strike bans wallet: registration rejected, excluded from all routes
- Banned wallet's unpaid pending balance is not paid at next settlement
- Probation: first N jobs (default 50) accrue no pending balance; node CLI shows remaining
- Integration test: deliberately-bad node loses pending, accrues strikes, banned within 60 requests
- Forfeiture events visible in tracker logs and settlement history
Blocked by
07-fraud-detection-slash.md31-billing-ledger.md