tasks

.scratch/alpha-hardening/issues/01-c1-gossip-auth.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Add authenticated peer identity to all tracker gossip mutation endpoints. Today
 - `packages/tracker/meshnet_tracker/billing.py` — `apply_events` (~301–311)
 - `packages/tracker/meshnet_tracker/accounts.py` — `apply_events` (~220–226)
 
-Implement per ADR-0017 §3: shared hive HMAC (body + timestamp) or mutual TLS between configured tracker peers. Reject unauthenticated gossip with 401.
+Implement per ADR-0017 §3 using the auth helper/config from issue 02: shared hive HMAC (body + timestamp) or mutual TLS between configured tracker peers. Reject unauthenticated gossip with 401.
 
 **Note:** `/v1/gossip` (node throughput fan-out, `server.py` ~1331) is **not** in scope for this issue — see ADR-0017 §3 out-of-scope note.
 
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Implement per ADR-0017 §3: shared hive HMAC (body + timestamp) or mutual TLS be
 
 1. Red: unauthenticated POST to `/v1/billing/gossip` applies a credit event today — test must fail after fix.
 2. Red: authenticated peer with valid HMAC applies events; invalid/missing auth returns 401 and `applied: 0`.
-3. Green: implement verifier + config (`--hive-secret` or peer cert paths).
+3. Green: wire the issue-02 verifier/config (`--hive-secret` or peer cert paths) into the three hive mutation endpoints.
 
 ## Acceptance criteria
 
@@ -38,4 +38,4 @@ Implement per ADR-0017 §3: shared hive HMAC (body + timestamp) or mutual TLS be
 
 ## Blocked by
 
-None — implement alongside or immediately before `02-a2-unified-auth-boundary.md`.
+- `02-a2-unified-auth-boundary.md` — owns shared auth middleware/config. Implement in the same PR if simpler.

.scratch/alpha-hardening/issues/02-a2-unified-auth-boundary.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Status: ready-for-agent
 
 ## What to build
 
-Replace header-presence stubs with a single auth middleware that resolves API keys, admin sessions, validator service tokens, and hive peer identity. Close leaks on financial and operator endpoints.
+Replace header-presence stubs with a single auth middleware that resolves API keys, admin sessions, validator service tokens, and hive peer identity. Close leaks on financial and operator endpoints. This is the auth foundation issue; issue 01 should only apply hive auth to gossip endpoints once the helper exists.
 
 **Code refs:**
 
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Replace header-presence stubs with a single auth middleware that resolves API ke
 - `packages/tracker/meshnet_tracker/server.py` — `_session_account` (~2468+), `_handle_admin_accounts` (~2588–2608) — H4
 - `packages/tracker/meshnet_tracker/accounts.py` — `session_account()`, `create_session()` only (session store; not handler wiring)
 
-Per ADR-0017 §4: forfeit → validator or admin; benchmark → admin; billing summary/settlements/registry wallets → admin session. Forfeit validator identity: see `20-validator-service-token.md`.
+Per ADR-0017 §4: forfeit → validator or admin; benchmark → admin; billing summary/settlements/registry wallets → admin session. Include the validator service token shape from `20-validator-service-token.md` in the same implementation if practical.
 
 ## Test-first
 
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ Per ADR-0017 §4: forfeit → validator or admin; benchmark → admin; billing s
 ## Acceptance criteria
 
 - [ ] Single `_require_auth(role=...)` (or equivalent) used by all privileged handlers
+- [ ] Shared auth config supports admin sessions, validator service token, and hive peer HMAC/mTLS
 - [ ] Forfeit accepts only validator service token or admin session — not arbitrary Bearer strings
 - [ ] Financial read endpoints require admin session (alpha posture)
 - [ ] Benchmark write/read require admin or service token
@@ -38,8 +39,8 @@ Per ADR-0017 §4: forfeit → validator or admin; benchmark → admin; billing s
 
 ## Related
 
-- `20-validator-service-token.md` — validator service token format, rotation, forfeit auth
+- `20-validator-service-token.md` — checklist for validator service token format, rotation, forfeit auth
 
 ## Blocked by
 
-- `01-c1-gossip-auth.md` (shared auth config)
+None. This issue should land before `01-c1-gossip-auth.md`.

.scratch/alpha-hardening/issues/04-h2-tracker-authoritative-accounting.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Status: ready-for-agent
 
 ## What to build
 
-Stop trusting node-reported usage for billing. The tracker already proxies responses — count tokens from the proxied stream/body and compute work units from the **route it constructed**, not node declarations.
+Stop trusting node-reported usage for billing. The tracker already proxies responses — use tracker-observed response data and request limits to cap billable tokens, and compute work units from the **route it constructed**, not node declarations.
 
 **Code refs:**
 
@@ -17,13 +17,14 @@ Accounting fraud = inflating tokens or shard span. Per ADR-0018 §5.
 
 ## Test-first
 
-1. Red: mock upstream returns inflated `usage.total_tokens` in body but tracker bills that value — test expects tracker-measured count.
+1. Red: mock upstream returns inflated `usage.total_tokens` in body but tracker bills that value — test expects the tracker to cap billable tokens from observed stream chunks or request bounds.
 2. Red: node registers false `shard_end`; billing uses tracker route span, not registration field alone.
 3. Green: authoritative counters; ignore node-reported work units on charge path.
 
 ## Acceptance criteria
 
-- [ ] Token count for billing derived from tracker-parsed proxy response — **prefer tracker-measured stream chunk count**; when upstream `usage.total_tokens` is present, use the **minimum** of tracker count and node-reported value (cap inflated node usage)
+- [ ] Streaming token count uses tracker-observed chunks/tokens; upstream `usage.total_tokens` can only lower or match that observed count, never inflate it
+- [ ] Non-streaming token count caps upstream `usage.total_tokens` by tracker-known request bounds (`max_tokens`, and prompt estimate if available); exact tokenizer-backed counts are deferred unless already available locally
 - [ ] Work units = tracker-computed layer span per hop at route build time (~1781–1782)
 - [ ] Nodes cannot increase payout by lying about shard range mid-request
 - [ ] Integration test: malicious node metadata does not inflate `charge_request` shares

.scratch/alpha-hardening/issues/06-fraud-toploc-integration.md

@@ -6,12 +6,12 @@ Status: ready-for-agent
 
 Adopt [TOPLOC](https://github.com/PrimeIntellect-ai/toploc) (MIT, `pip install toploc`) for activation fingerprint commit and verify. Replace string-equality validator checks with teacher-forced prefill + TOPLOC tolerance matching.
 
-**Estimated effort:** 2+ sessions — split into subtasks below without separate issue files.
+**Estimated effort:** 2+ sessions. First landing should be the validator-only TOPLOC primitive and docs; node runtime commitments/on-demand capture can follow in issue 07 if this grows.
 
 | Subtask | Owner package | Deliverable |
 |---|---|---|
 | Validator audit primitive | `packages/validator/` | Teacher-forced prefill, TOPLOC verify, unit tests with stub tensors |
-| Node runtime commitments | `packages/node/` (if prover-side) | On-demand activation fingerprint generation on audit-selected requests |
+| Node runtime commitments | `packages/node/` (if prover-side) | On-demand activation fingerprint generation on audit-selected requests; move to issue 07 if it blocks the validator primitive |
 
 **Code refs:**
 

.scratch/alpha-hardening/issues/08-fraud-reputation-model-persistence.md

@@ -17,13 +17,13 @@ Implement graduated reputation per ADR-0018 §6: score derives only from tracker
 
 ## Test-first
 
-1. Red: no reputation field — add schema + default 1.0 for new wallets.
-2. Green: clean audit +0.05 (tunable); failed audit −0.3 and strike; three strikes → ban persisted.
+1. Red: persisted reputation/strike fields from issue 05 are ignored by scoring/routing today.
+2. Green: clean audit +0.05 (tunable); failed audit −0.3 and strike; three strikes → ban persisted via issue-05 fields.
 3. Inactivity decay after N days without completed jobs.
 
 ## Acceptance criteria
 
-- [ ] `reputation_score` persisted in registry SQLite (issue 05)
+- [ ] Uses `reputation_score` and strike/ban fields persisted by issue 05; does not introduce a second schema path
 - [ ] Audit pass/fail updates score with documented deltas
 - [ ] Strike applies ×0.8 multiplier to routing weight (separate from forfeiture amount)
 - [ ] Ban at 3 strikes; probation job count still enforced

.scratch/alpha-hardening/issues/17-doc-duplicate-us020-dedup.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-Status: ready-for-agent
+Status: ready-for-human
 
 # 17 — DOC: Duplicate US-020 issue dedup
 
@@ -20,4 +20,4 @@ Resolve numbering collision without losing history.
 
 ## Blocked by
 
-Human approval for renumbering
+Human approval for renumbering. An agent may prepare the mapping note, but must not run `git mv` or rewrite cross-links until the canonical number is approved.

.scratch/alpha-hardening/issues/19-doc-cryptography-test-env.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Status: ready-for-agent
 
 ## What to build
 
-Document and verify test/dev environment setup for wallet crypto paths. `packages/node/meshnet_node/wallet.py` uses `cryptography`; failures occur when `.venv` lacks deps.
+Document and verify test/dev environment setup for wallet crypto paths. `packages/node/meshnet_node/wallet.py` uses `cryptography`; failures occur when `.venv` lacks deps. `cryptography>=41` is already declared in `packages/node/pyproject.toml`, so this issue should focus on documenting the editable-install path and only add root/dev extras if tests still import the node wallet without installing the node package.
 
 **Code refs:**
 
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ Document and verify test/dev environment setup for wallet crypto paths. `package
 
 ## Acceptance criteria
 
-- [ ] Confirm `cryptography` in node package deps; add to root/dev extras if tests import wallet without node install
-- [ ] Add short **Test environment** section to `CONTRIBUTING.md` or `docs/dev/test-env.md`: use `.venv/Scripts/python.exe`, `pip install -e packages/node ...`, optional dep skips
+- [ ] Confirm `cryptography>=41` remains in node package deps; add to root/dev extras only if tests import wallet without node install
+- [ ] Add short **Test environment** section to `docs/dev/test-env.md` (or `CONTRIBUTING.md` if created): use `.venv/Scripts/python.exe`, `pip install -e packages/node ...`, optional dep skips
 - [ ] Note which tests require optional deps (`--ignore=test_openai_gateway,...`)
 - [ ] No unrelated production code changes
 

.scratch/alpha-hardening/issues/20-validator-service-token.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Status: ready-for-agent
 
 ## What to build
 
-Define and implement a **validator service token** distinct from client API keys and admin sessions. The validator process must authenticate when calling `POST /v1/billing/forfeit`; arbitrary Bearer strings and client API keys must be rejected.
+Define and implement a **validator service token** distinct from client API keys and admin sessions. The validator process must authenticate when calling `POST /v1/billing/forfeit`; arbitrary Bearer strings and client API keys must be rejected. This is a checklist subtask for issue 02 and should normally land in the same PR as the unified auth middleware.
 
 Per [ADR-0017 §4](../../docs/adr/0017-tracker-authentication-and-authorization.md): forfeit accepts **validator service identity or admin session** only.
 

.scratch/alpha-hardening/issues/22-doc-memory-project-status.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-Status: ready-for-agent
+Status: done
 
 # 22 — DOC: MEMORY.md + project-status alpha-hardening index
 
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ Update persistent memory files so agents and humans find the alpha-hardening fea
 
 ## Acceptance criteria
 
-- [ ] `.claude/memory/MEMORY.md` — index entry for alpha-hardening (`.scratch/alpha-hardening/`, ADRs 0016–0019, issue count)
-- [ ] `.claude/memory/project-status.md` — brief alpha-hardening section: planning complete, Bucket 1 blockers next, link README
-- [ ] Cross-link `.scratch/alpha-hardening/handoff.md` from README (not temp path)
+- [x] `.claude/memory/MEMORY.md` — index entry for alpha-hardening (`.scratch/alpha-hardening/`, ADRs 0016–0019, issue count)
+- [x] `.claude/memory/project-status.md` — brief alpha-hardening section: planning complete, Bucket 1 blockers next, link README
+- [x] Cross-link `.scratch/alpha-hardening/handoff.md` from README (not temp path)
 
 ## ADR links
 
@@ -18,4 +18,8 @@ Update persistent memory files so agents and humans find the alpha-hardening fea
 
 ## Blocked by
 
-None — parallel with other Bucket 3 doc issues
+None — completed
+
+## Comments
+
+2026-07-04 triage: already satisfied by `.claude/memory/MEMORY.md`, `.claude/memory/project-status.md`, and `.scratch/alpha-hardening/README.md`.