Add alpha-hardening ADRs and issue plan from pre-release audit.

Lock alpha scope, tracker auth, TOPLOC fraud verification, and deferred multi-tracker money-path work; supersede legacy fraud issues with ADR-0018.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

.scratch/alpha-hardening/issues/04-h2-tracker-authoritative-accounting.md

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+Status: ready-for-agent
+
+# 04 — H2: Tracker-authoritative token and work-unit accounting
+
+## What to build
+
+Stop trusting node-reported usage for billing. The tracker already proxies responses — count tokens from the proxied stream/body and compute work units from the **route it constructed**, not node declarations.
+
+**Code refs:**
+
+- `packages/tracker/meshnet_tracker/server.py` — `node_work` from route construction (~1776–1782, ~1781–1782)
+- `packages/tracker/meshnet_tracker/server.py` — streaming token/chunk billing (~1890–1921)
+- `packages/tracker/meshnet_tracker/server.py` — non-streaming `_usage_total_tokens` (~1938–1943)
+- `packages/tracker/meshnet_tracker/billing.py` — `charge_request` node_work split (~104–151)
+
+Accounting fraud = inflating tokens or shard span. Per ADR-0018 §5.
+
+## Test-first
+
+1. Red: mock upstream returns inflated `usage.total_tokens` in body but tracker bills that value — test expects tracker-measured count.
+2. Red: node registers false `shard_end`; billing uses tracker route span, not registration field alone.
+3. Green: authoritative counters; ignore node-reported work units on charge path.
+
+## Acceptance criteria
+
+- [ ] Token count for billing derived from tracker-parsed proxy response — **prefer tracker-measured stream chunk count**; when upstream `usage.total_tokens` is present, use the **minimum** of tracker count and node-reported value (cap inflated node usage)
+- [ ] Work units = tracker-computed layer span per hop at route build time (~1781–1782)
+- [ ] Nodes cannot increase payout by lying about shard range mid-request
+- [ ] Integration test: malicious node metadata does not inflate `charge_request` shares
+
+## ADR links
+
+- [ADR-0018](../../docs/adr/0018-fraud-detection-verification-and-reputation.md) §5
+
+## Blocked by
+
+- `02-a2-unified-auth-boundary.md`