refine blockchain integration and protocols

docs/issues/34-forfeiture-penalty.md

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+Status: ready-for-agent
+
+# 34 — Hardened proof-of-work: pending-balance forfeiture penalty
+
+## What to build
+
+Wire the validator's ~5% sampling (issue 07) to the new penalty per ADR-0015. On confirmed output divergence:
+
+1. The node's **entire pending balance is forfeited** to the protocol cut, in the same ledger transaction as the strike (no window where a payout can race the penalty).
+2. A **strike** is recorded; the third strike **bans** the wallet — registration rejected, excluded from all routes, and any unpaid pending balance is never paid out.
+
+The probationary period (first N jobs unpaid, default 50) is retained as the anti-sybil re-entry cost, and the node CLI shows remaining probation jobs.
+
+Why this deters cheating: settlement is periodic, so the pending balance itself is the collateral — no upfront stake deposit, zero onboarding friction. At a 5% check rate a cheater is caught once per ~20 fraudulent jobs, so the penalty must exceed ~20× the per-job gain; with daily settlement, pending ≈ a full day's earnings, well above that bar. Document this math in the validator README.
+
+## Acceptance criteria
+
+- [ ] Divergence → pending balance forfeited to `protocol_cut` atomically with the strike
+- [ ] 3rd strike bans wallet: registration rejected, excluded from all routes
+- [ ] Banned wallet's unpaid pending balance is not paid at next settlement
+- [ ] Probation: first N jobs (default 50) accrue no pending balance; node CLI shows remaining
+- [ ] Integration test: deliberately-bad node loses pending, accrues strikes, banned within 60 requests
+- [ ] Forfeiture events visible in tracker logs and settlement history
+
+## Blocked by
+
+- `07-fraud-detection-slash.md`
+- `31-billing-ledger.md`