# ADR-0016: Alpha scope and known limitations

## Status: Accepted

## Context

Pre-release audits found the routing layer is solid (ADR-0013) but the money and trust paths are not alpha-ready: unauthenticated gossip, free starting credit, node-reported accounting, ephemeral strike/ban state, and plaintext tracker HTTP undermine release. The owner locked an **alpha scope** that ships real inference and devnet settlement while explicitly deferring multi-tracker trustlessness and cryptographic verification.

## Decisions

### 1. Single settlement tracker

One operator-designated tracker holds the treasury keypair and runs the settlement loop (ADR-0015). Third-party trackers may join the hive for routing and state replication but **never** sign payouts. Raft elects a leader for shard-assignment commands only; settlement leadership is operator-configured, not democratic.

### 2. Open node join

Any wallet may register a node without invite, stake deposit, or hardware attestation. Anti-sybil cost comes from probation (first N jobs unpaid), carried-forward reputation, and fraud penalties — not from closed admission.

### 3. Devnet mock-USDT

Development and alpha target **Solana devnet** with a self-created mock-USDT SPL mint (ADR-0015). Mainnet USDT is a config change, not an architecture change. TAI settlement (ADR-0002) remains deferred; the 10% protocol cut accumulates as future TAI liquidity.

### 4. Reputation carries forward

Strike count, ban status, graduated reputation, and audit history **persist across tracker restarts** and are intended to survive alpha → mainnet cutover. A banned operator cannot evade penalties by restarting the tracker or re-registering under a fresh node id with the same wallet.

### 5. Known alpha limitations (explicit, not bugs)

| Limitation | Alpha posture | Post-alpha path |
|---|---|---|
| Tracker is trusted referee for audits and blame | Acceptable — see ADR-0018 | Decentralized verifier market; Verde-style on-chain games |
| Plaintext HTTP on tracker/node paths | Acceptable on LAN/dev; relay TLS only (ADR-0010 amended) | Full TLS + cert pinning per ADR-0010 intent |
| Unauthenticated gossip replication | **Blocker** — fix before alpha (ADR-0017) | HMAC/mTLS between hive members |
| zkML / GPU TEE verification | Roadmap-only | ADR-0018 §9; re-evaluate yearly |
| Multi-tracker money-path safety | Design now (ADR-0019), implement later | Consensus-gated settlement, idempotent payouts |
| Bitwise output equality across GPUs | Not required — logit/activation tolerance (TOPLOC) | Optional Gensyn RepOps tier for referee |

### 6. Fraud must be bounded

Because reputation carries forward, correctness fraud (bad outputs) and accounting fraud (inflated tokens/shard spans) must be **economically irrational** at the locked ~5% audit budget. Detection, blame, and penalty design are ADR-0018; implementation is Bucket 1 in `.scratch/alpha-hardening/`.

## Consequences

- Alpha release criteria are Bucket 1 blockers in `.scratch/alpha-hardening/README.md`, not "all 35 user stories done."
- Documentation and runbooks must state trust assumptions plainly — custodial treasury, trusted tracker, devnet funds.
- Bucket 2 (multi-tracker) issues are tracked but not alpha-blocking.

## Related

- Supersedes the spirit of prototype-only trust in ADR-0003 for production alpha behavior — see ADR-0018.
- Settlement mechanics: ADR-0015.
- Research grounding: `.scratch/alpha-hardening/research-verifiable-inference.md`.