# meshnet-validator

Optimistic fraud detection (ADR-0003, penalty amended by ADR-0015): the
validator re-runs a random ~5% sample of completed inference requests against
a trusted reference node and, on divergence, submits a slash proof and
forfeits the node's pending balance.

## Why the penalty deters cheating

There is no upfront stake. Settlement is periodic (US-033), so a node always
has an unpaid **pending balance** — that balance *is* the collateral.

At a sampling rate `p`, a cheater is caught on average once every `1/p`
fraudulent jobs, so cheating is unprofitable when:

```
penalty > per_job_gain / p        # p = 0.05  →  penalty > 20 × per_job_gain
```

With the production settlement period of 24h, the pending balance at any
moment approximates a full day's earnings — hundreds to thousands of jobs —
which is far above the 20× bar. Each catch also records a strike; three
strikes ban the wallet (registration rejected, excluded from routes, unpaid
pending never settled), and the probationary period (first N jobs unpaid)
makes re-entry with a fresh wallet costly.

Two operational notes:

- Shortening the settlement period shrinks the collateral. Period changes
  must weigh chain overhead against deterrence.
- A cheater immediately after a payout has little to forfeit — the
  strike/ban ladder covers that window.

## Usage

```python
ValidatorProcess(
    contracts=contracts,          # registry/validation boundary
    billing=ledger,               # BillingLedger — enables forfeiture
    reference_node_url="http://...",
    sample_rate=0.05,
)
```

Remote validators can instead call the tracker's privileged
`POST /v1/billing/forfeit` endpoint (non-empty Authorization header).